Facts About Houthis
Founded in Early 1990s, emerged as a revivalist/community movement among Yemen’s Zaydi Shia minority (roughly 30–35% of population; Zaydism is distinct from Twelver Shia).
Named after the founder Hussein al-Houthi, who began resisting government marginalization; killed by Yemeni forces in 2004. His family and followers continued the movement.
Core early grievances: Discrimination under the central government, corruption, foreign influence, and weak governance in northern Yemen.
Rise to Power
Houthis fought six wars with Yemen’s government from 2004–2010. Then in 2014-2015, Houthis captured Sanaa and advanced south; the Saudi-led military coalition intervened in March 2015 to restore the internationally recognized government.
As a result, Yemen remains split — Houthis hold Sanaa, northern highlands, and the Red Sea coast; other factions control southern/eastern areas. The war has caused one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Status & Alignment
They govern ~two-thirds of Yemen’s population but lack international recognition as a state authority.
Although backed by Iran — receiving funding, weapons, training, and technical support — but is not an Iranian proxy; it has its own independent Yemeni agenda.
US, UK, EU, and UN do not formally list the Houthis as a terrorist organization; some officials have proposed designation but it remains controversial due to humanitarian risks.
Red Sea Attacks (2023–Present)
Launched drone/missile attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea, stating action is in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.
Targeted ships linked to Israel, US, UK, and others; severely disrupted global trade routes.
Faced retaliatory strikes by US, UK, and other forces; has since expanded range of attacks and threatened energy infrastructure and international shipping lanes.
Mecca Defence Alliance
Saudi Arabia, Türkiye (Turkey), and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, 2026. The agreement says that an armed attack against one of the three is to be regarded as an attack against all three, and commits them to deeper defense cooperation.
For example, if Saudi Arabia were attacked, Pakistan and Türkiye would not necessarily be required to immediately send troops—the exact military response depends on circumstances—but the agreement establishes a commitment to collective defense.
No other country has joined yet — more than 6 have expressed interest, but membership is not open until the pact is fully established.
Saudi Arabia has traditionally relied heavily on the United States for its security. But the recent regional wars and attacks involving Iran, Israel, the Houthis and other armed groups have encouraged Riyadh to develop additional security relationships.
Did Türkiye & Pakistan Help When Saudi Was Attacked?
The short answer is yes, but politically & with coordination, and no direct combat operations yet against the Houthis. The alliance exists more as a political-security framework right now — its actual military capability in a real conflict remains unproven.
Pakistan avoids getting dragged into Yemen, whereas Türkiye maintains ties with both Saudi & Iran. Commitments are consultative, not automatic — members decide together what support to give. Saudi also asked US for help; Trump reportedly declined — pushing Mecca pact's credibility under scrutiny.
What Are the Abraham Accords?
The Abraham Accords are a set of agreements, brokered by the United States, signed September 15, 2020, to establish full diplomatic relations and normalize ties between Israel and several Arab/Muslim-majority states.
Named after Abraham — the common spiritual ancestor of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — to symbolize shared heritage and coexistence.
The Abraham Accords broke the long-standing Arab rule of "no relations with Israel until Palestine is solved." Instead, it built peace through shared interests — trade, tech, and countering Iran. It survived the Gaza war but is smaller and slower than originally hoped, with Saudi Arabia — the biggest potential prize — still on the sidelines.
Straits of Hormuz is disrupted by Iran
Saudi Arabia has an alternative route around Hormuz, but that alternative ultimately depends on the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb remaining usable. If both chokepoints are seriously disrupted, Saudi oil exports become much harder.
Saudi Arabia's major oil fields are in the east, near the Persian Gulf.
Normally: Saudi oil fields → Saudi Gulf ports → Strait of Hormuz → Indian Ocean → customers
So if Iran seriously disrupts Hormuz, Saudi oil sitting in eastern Saudi Arabia has difficulty reaching the international market by sea.
The Strait of Hormuz normally handles roughly 20 million barrels/day of oil and petroleum liquids, making it one of the world's most important oil chokepoints.
Saudi Arabia built a "back door": the East-West Pipeline
Saudi Arabia has a roughly 1,200-km East-West Pipeline, also known as Petroline (this is Saudi Arabia's very important backup). Built in the 1980s, East-West Pipeline (Petroline) has 7 million bpd capacity from eastern oilfields → Yanbu port on the Red Sea.
It runs from the Eastern Saudi oil fields across Saudi Arabia to Yanbu port.
So instead of from Persian Gulf → Hormuz, Saudi Arabia can do from Persian Gulf oil fields → pipeline → Yanbu → Red Sea → international tanker. That completely bypasses Hormuz.
During the 2026 Hormuz disruption, Saudi Arabia significantly increased the amount of oil sent west through this pipeline. The IEA reported that Yanbu exports rose from around 2 million barrels/day before the war to more than 5 million barrels/day in early June.
Bab el-Mandeb strait is disrupted by Houthis
Yanbu is on the Red Sea. To send Saudi oil from Yanbu toward Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic, tankers generally need to travel from Yanbu → Red Sea → Bab el-Mandeb → Gulf of Aden → Indian Ocean.
Or toward the Suez Canal: Yanbu → Red Sea → Bab el-Mandeb → Red Sea/Suez route → Mediterranean.
From here, the Houthis create another problem. Iran threatens the front door while Houthis threaten the back door.
The Attack of East-West Pipeline
On September 11, 2026, Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline was damaged by drone attacks and temporarily shut down. Reuters reported that the pipeline had been serving as the major alternative to Hormuz.
So Saudi Arabia temporarily faced: Hormuz disrupted by Iran, East-West Pipeline damaged, and Bab el-Mandeb threatened by Houthis. That's a serious combination.
Bypass Bab al-Mandeb → Go North Through Egypt
Since Houthis block the southern Red Sea exit, tankers sail north from Yanbu instead of south.
Shuttle tankers carry crude up the Red Sea to Ain Sokhna (Egypt, Gulf of Suez). Offload into SUMED Pipeline — 320 km overland across Egypt → Sidi Kerir on the Mediterranean. Reload onto deep-draft tankers → sail to Europe, or around Africa to Asia (+20–25 days voyage).
Saudi survives because it built the Petroline 40 years ago — it's the only country with enough cross-country capacity to keep exporting at scale. But it's running at reduced efficiency, paying premium shipping costs, and every route is now a target. Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain have no comparable backup and suffer the most.
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